The concept of intuition in Haidt's social intuitionist model

Tässä tutkielmassa tarkastelen sosiaalipsykologi Jonathan Haidtin sosiaalis-intuitionistista mallia ja intuitiota sosiaalisen intuitionismin avainkäsitteenä. Sosiaalis-intuitionistinen malli on kuvaus moraalisen ajattelun kausaalisista prosesseista. Sen tarkoituksena on kuvata, millaisten psykologis...

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Main Author: Putkinen, Joni
Other Authors: Humanistis-yhteiskuntatieteellinen tiedekunta, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Yhteiskuntatieteiden ja filosofian laitos, Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy, Jyväskylän yliopisto, University of Jyväskylä
Format: Master's thesis
Language:eng
Published: 2019
Subjects:
Online Access: https://jyx.jyu.fi/handle/123456789/66767
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author Putkinen, Joni
author2 Humanistis-yhteiskuntatieteellinen tiedekunta Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences Yhteiskuntatieteiden ja filosofian laitos Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy Jyväskylän yliopisto University of Jyväskylä
author_facet Putkinen, Joni Humanistis-yhteiskuntatieteellinen tiedekunta Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences Yhteiskuntatieteiden ja filosofian laitos Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy Jyväskylän yliopisto University of Jyväskylä Putkinen, Joni Humanistis-yhteiskuntatieteellinen tiedekunta Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences Yhteiskuntatieteiden ja filosofian laitos Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy Jyväskylän yliopisto University of Jyväskylä
author_sort Putkinen, Joni
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description Tässä tutkielmassa tarkastelen sosiaalipsykologi Jonathan Haidtin sosiaalis-intuitionistista mallia ja intuitiota sosiaalisen intuitionismin avainkäsitteenä. Sosiaalis-intuitionistinen malli on kuvaus moraalisen ajattelun kausaalisista prosesseista. Sen tarkoituksena on kuvata, millaisten psykologisten mekanismien välityksellä moraalisiin arvostelmiin yleensä päädytään. Haidtin mukaan moraaliset arvostelmat ovat suurimmaksi osaksi intuitioiden aiheuttamia. Intuitiot ovat nopeita ja tiedostamattomia, kehollisia reaktioita, jotka syntyvät automaattisesti ja vaikuttavat arvostelmiin ennen kuin tietoinen ja hallittu ajattelu eli moraalinen järkeily ehtii käynnistyä. Intuitiivisen ajattelun vahva merkitys moraalisessa ajattelussa johdattaa kysymään, toimiiko järkeily vain intuitioiden palveluksessa vai voiko se tuottaa arvostelmia intuitioista riippumatta. Haidt asettuu puolustamaan intuitionistista moraalikäsitystä rationalistisia moraalikäsityksiä vastaan. Hänen mukaansa filosofian ja moraalipsykologian historiasta löytyy lukuisia esimerkkejä siitä, kuinka valistuneet ajattelijat ovat olleet valmiita uskomaan ja luottamaan moraalisen järkeilyn voimaan intuitiivisen ja emotionaalisen puolen hallitsemisessa. Sosiaalinen intuitionismi ei kuitenkaan seiso yksin järkeä vastaan tässä intellektuaalisessa kamppailussa, vaan sillä on teoreettisia edeltäjiä sekä moraalipsykologiassa että moraalifilosofiassa. Moraalipsykologiassa se on jatkoa 1980-luvun kognitiiviselle intuitionismille. Moraalifilosofiassa se kiinnittyy sentimentalistiseen metaetiikkaan ja erityisesti valistusfilosofi David Humen ajatteluun. Tutkimuksessani pyrin vastaamaan kahteen tarkastelua ohjaavaan kysymykseen. Ensiksi selvitän, mitä intuitiolla tarkkaan ottaen tarkoitetaan. Tämä osuus on eräänlaista intuitiokäsitteen semantiikkaa Haidtin mallin ja sosiaalisen intuitionismin ympärillä käydyn keskustelun puitteissa. Toinen kysymys liittyy intuitio-käsitteen oikeuttamiseen. Voidaanko intuitiota pitää perusteltuna teoreettisena postulaattina? Ovatko intuitiot niin merkittäviä moraalisen ajattelun ainesosia, että niitä tulisi pitää varteenotettavana uhkana moraalisen järkeilyn asemalle ja arvostukselle? Tarkastelussani hyödynnän Haidtin kirjoittamia moraalipsykologisia kirjoituksia, joiden kirjoittamisen ajankohta ulottuu 1990-luvulta aina viime vuosiin saakka. Lisäksi huomioin Haidtin ja hänen malliaan tutkineiden kriitikoiden välisen tieteellisen keskustelun, joka pakotti Haidtin täsmentämään intuitio-käsitettään ja puolustamaan intuitioiden merkitystä moraalisessa ajattelussa. In this thesis I’m exploring social psychologist Jonathan Haidt’s social intuitionist model and his concept of intuition, which is a crucial word in social intuitionist thinking. Social intuitionist model is a portrayal of causal processes in moral thinking. It is meant to describe, what sorts of psychological mechanisms are usually causing moral judgments to appear. According to Haidt, moral judgments are caused by intuitions for the most part. Intuitions are fast and unconscious, corporeal reactions, which spring up automatically and affect judgments before conscious and controlled thinking or moral reasoning has time to get started. The great significance of intuitive thinking in moral thought propels to ask if reasoning functions only to serve intuitions or if it’s able to generate judgments regardless of intuitions. Haidt sets to defend intuitionist conception of morality against rationalist conceptions. He says that the history of philosophy and moral psychology is rich with examples of how enlightened intellects have been willing and trusting to adapt a belief, where moral reasoning is thought to govern intuitive and emotional side. Social intuitionism doesn’t stand against reason alone in this intellectual wrestle, however, so much as it has predecessors both in moral psychology and moral philosophy. In moral psychology it continues the work of cognitive intuitionism from the 1980s. In moral philosophy it adheres to sentimentalist metaethics and especially to thought of David Hume, a philosopher from the Enlightment era. I seek to give answers to two questions that are guiding the analysis. First I examine what intuition denotes. This part is certain kind of semantics about the concept of intuition, within the framework that’s provided by social intuitionist model and discussions around social intuitionism. Second question relates to the justification of intuitions. Is the concept of intuition a well-reasoned theoretical postulate? Do intuitions play a significant part in moral thinking, so significant that they should be dealt with respect and considered a threat to moral reasoning’s status and appreciation? In this work I utilize Haidt’s moral psychological writings, first articles written in 1990s and latest in just recent years. Additionally, I make observations about the scientific discussion between Haidt and his critics, which forced him to elaborate his concept of intuition and defend the significance of intuitions in moral thinking.
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Sosiaalis-intuitionistinen malli on kuvaus moraalisen ajattelun kausaalisista prosesseista. Sen tarkoituksena on kuvata, millaisten psykologisten mekanismien v\u00e4lityksell\u00e4 moraalisiin arvostelmiin yleens\u00e4 p\u00e4\u00e4dyt\u00e4\u00e4n. Haidtin mukaan moraaliset arvostelmat ovat suurimmaksi osaksi intuitioiden aiheuttamia. Intuitiot ovat nopeita ja tiedostamattomia, kehollisia reaktioita, jotka syntyv\u00e4t automaattisesti ja vaikuttavat arvostelmiin ennen kuin tietoinen ja hallittu ajattelu eli moraalinen j\u00e4rkeily ehtii k\u00e4ynnisty\u00e4. Intuitiivisen ajattelun vahva merkitys moraalisessa ajattelussa johdattaa kysym\u00e4\u00e4n, toimiiko j\u00e4rkeily vain intuitioiden palveluksessa vai voiko se tuottaa arvostelmia intuitioista riippumatta. \nHaidt asettuu puolustamaan intuitionistista moraalik\u00e4sityst\u00e4 rationalistisia moraalik\u00e4sityksi\u00e4 vastaan. H\u00e4nen mukaansa filosofian ja moraalipsykologian historiasta l\u00f6ytyy lukuisia esimerkkej\u00e4 siit\u00e4, kuinka valistuneet ajattelijat ovat olleet valmiita uskomaan ja luottamaan moraalisen j\u00e4rkeilyn voimaan intuitiivisen ja emotionaalisen puolen hallitsemisessa. Sosiaalinen intuitionismi ei kuitenkaan seiso yksin j\u00e4rke\u00e4 vastaan t\u00e4ss\u00e4 intellektuaalisessa kamppailussa, vaan sill\u00e4 on teoreettisia edelt\u00e4ji\u00e4 sek\u00e4 moraalipsykologiassa ett\u00e4 moraalifilosofiassa. Moraalipsykologiassa se on jatkoa 1980-luvun kognitiiviselle intuitionismille. Moraalifilosofiassa se kiinnittyy sentimentalistiseen metaetiikkaan ja erityisesti valistusfilosofi David Humen ajatteluun. \nTutkimuksessani pyrin vastaamaan kahteen tarkastelua ohjaavaan kysymykseen. Ensiksi selvit\u00e4n, mit\u00e4 intuitiolla tarkkaan ottaen tarkoitetaan. T\u00e4m\u00e4 osuus on er\u00e4\u00e4nlaista intuitiok\u00e4sitteen semantiikkaa Haidtin mallin ja sosiaalisen intuitionismin ymp\u00e4rill\u00e4 k\u00e4ydyn keskustelun puitteissa. Toinen kysymys liittyy intuitio-k\u00e4sitteen oikeuttamiseen. Voidaanko intuitiota pit\u00e4\u00e4 perusteltuna teoreettisena postulaattina? Ovatko intuitiot niin merkitt\u00e4vi\u00e4 moraalisen ajattelun ainesosia, ett\u00e4 niit\u00e4 tulisi pit\u00e4\u00e4 varteenotettavana uhkana moraalisen j\u00e4rkeilyn asemalle ja arvostukselle? Tarkastelussani hy\u00f6dynn\u00e4n Haidtin kirjoittamia moraalipsykologisia kirjoituksia, joiden kirjoittamisen ajankohta ulottuu 1990-luvulta aina viime vuosiin saakka. 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spellingShingle Putkinen, Joni The concept of intuition in Haidt's social intuitionist model Filosofia Philosophy 201 järkeily etiikka moraali intuitio moraalipsykologia järki reasoning ethics morals intuition moral psychology reason
title The concept of intuition in Haidt's social intuitionist model
title_full The concept of intuition in Haidt's social intuitionist model
title_fullStr The concept of intuition in Haidt's social intuitionist model The concept of intuition in Haidt's social intuitionist model
title_full_unstemmed The concept of intuition in Haidt's social intuitionist model The concept of intuition in Haidt's social intuitionist model
title_short The concept of intuition in Haidt's social intuitionist model
title_sort concept of intuition in haidt s social intuitionist model
title_txtP The concept of intuition in Haidt's social intuitionist model
topic Filosofia Philosophy 201 järkeily etiikka moraali intuitio moraalipsykologia järki reasoning ethics morals intuition moral psychology reason
topic_facet 201 Filosofia Philosophy ethics etiikka intuitio intuition järkeily järki moraali moraalipsykologia moral psychology morals reason reasoning
url https://jyx.jyu.fi/handle/123456789/66767 http://www.urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:jyu-201912125237
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